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US monetary policy is characterized by a substantial degree of inertia. While in prin-
ciple this may well be the outcome of an optimizing central bank behaviour, the ability
of any derived policy rule to match the data relies on so large weights for interest rate
smoothing into policy makers’ preferences as to be theoretically ‡awed. In this paper
we investigate whether such a puzzle can be interpreted as resulting from the concern
of monetary authorities for potential misspeci…cations of the macroeconomic dynamics.
Accordingly, we use a novel thick modeling approach to incorporate model uncertainty
into the identi…cation of central bank’s preferences. The robust thick policy rule shows
the kind of smoothness observed in the data without resorting to implausible values for
the preference parameters.
JEL classi…cation: C61, E52, E58.
Keywords: Model uncertainty, interest rate smoothing, Fed policy preferences, robust
optimal monetary policy.
¤We wish to thank Carlo Favero and Guido Tabellini for stimulating discussions. Richard Dennis, Jordi
Galì, Massimiliano Marcellino, Michael McAleer, Anton Muscatelli, Brian Sack, Tommaso Monacelli, Stefania
Albanesi, Gaia Narciso, Marco Aiol…, Saverio Simonelli, and seminar participants at the University of Bari,
the University of Bergamo, the University of Munich, the SMYE 2002 at the University of Paris 1, and the
SES 2002 at the University of Abertay Dundee provided very useful comments. Corresponding author: Efrem
Castelnuovo c/o Angela Baldassarre, Università Bocconi, Via Sarfatti 25, 20136 Milano (Italy). E-mail account:
efrem.castelnuovo@uni-bocconi.it
11 Introduction
The US Federal Reserve tends to change short-term interest rates by small steps that move
in a particular direction over sustained periods and reverse only infrequently (see Rudebusch,
1995, and Goodhart, 1997). This prominent feature of policy rates, which is interchangeably
referred to as interest rate smoothing, policy gradualism or policy inertia, characterizes the
Fed response to in‡ation and output gaps as having been more moderate than an optimizing
central bank behavior would predict.
In a recent survey of evidence, Sack and Wieland (2000) interestingly discuss several
explanations to reconcile historical and optimal policy rules. A number of empirical studies
…nd that uncertainty creates incentives to smooth policy rates, in the form of either parameter
uncertainty or measurement error for in‡ation and output gap. Parameter uncertainty, which
is the uncertainty on the monetary transmission mechanism, alters the knowledge of decision
makers about the impact of policy action on the economy. Accordingly, a central bank that
adjusted aggressively policy rates to the developments in the economy would be more likely
to have unpredictable and therefore undesirable movements of output and in‡ation. Then,
as shown in the VAR analyses by Sack (2000), Salmon and Martin (1999), and Söderström
(1999), policy gradualism may be the optimal strategy to bring the relevant macroeconomic
variables in line with the targets.
Another source of uncertainty comes from the measurement errors on in‡ation and output
gap. Indeed, the evaluation of monetary policy in most empirical studies relies on the unreal-
istic assumption that policy makers know the state of the economy without error. However,
monetary policy mainly involves decisions that are based on real-time available information,
which are subject to frequent revisions after the initial release. Interestingly, Orphanides
(1998) shows that whenever policy makers take data uncertainty into account the estimated
policy response to in‡ation and output gaps is more moderate, thereby preventing the pos-
sibility of wide interest rate ‡uctuations due to measurement errors. This attenuation turns
out to be particularly relevant under simple policy rules, although it also emerges for optimal
policy rules.
These explanations have each proved to be statistically signi…cant, although none alone
has resulted to be quantitatively satisfactory (see Sack and Wieland, 2000). Moreover, interest
rate smoothing is derived as the optimal policy rule of a central bank whose only concerns
2are to stabilize output and in‡ation and the possibility that policy makers have an explicit
preference to penalize policy rate ‡uctuations is ruled out by assumption.
On the positive side, the inclusion of interest rate changes in the policy makers’ loss func-
tion can be justi…ed on several grounds (see Woodford, 2002, Ch. 7; Goodfriend, 1991 and
Lowe and Ellis, 1997). The empirical model proposed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999),
which includes an explicit interest rate smoothing goal, has become by now a popular frame-
work to analyze monetary policy under uncertainty (see Stock, 1999; Smets, 1999; Onatski and
Stock, 2002; Rudebusch, 2001 and Favero and Milani, 2001). For example, Rudebusch (2001)
argues that the interaction of several forms of uncertainty rather than a single one is likely to
generate the kind of smoothness observed in the data and points towards measurement errors
and model misspeci…cations as the most relevant candidates. In particular, the perturbation
of some key structural relations such as the in‡ation dynamics and the output sensitivity to
interest rate are shown, everything equals, to make smoother an otherwise volatile policy rate
behavior, thereby being an excellent starting point for the present analysis.
On the negative side, the ability of any optimal policy rule to match the data badly relies
on so large weights for the policy makers’ aversion to interest rate changes as the theory
cannot easily motivate. This suggests the potential for a strictly related issue, namely the
identi…cation of the Fed policy preferences. Indeed, several pioneering studies have proposed
alternative strategies to estimate the structural parameters in a small empirical model à la
Rudebusch and Svensson (see Favero and Rovelli, 2002; Dennis, 2001; Ozlale, 2001). While
extremely promising, these estimates have left the interest rate smoothing puzzle unsolved
in that any plausible set of preferences implies an optimal path for policy rates much more
volatile than the observed one.
In this paper we bring together the literature on model uncertainty and the one on central
bank’s preferences by using the progresses made in the former to solve the puzzle emerged in
the latter. To this end, we incorporate model uncertainty in the simple calibration method
we propose to identify the Fed policy preferences. In so doing, we investigate whether the
concern for model misspeci…cations can explain the inertial behavior of policy rates without
resorting to implausible weights, if any, for an interest rate smoothing goal.
The intuition for having more moderate policy responses when the model is misspeci…ed
comes from the policy makers’ agnosticism about what model provides the most accurate
description of the economy. Accordingly, a policy rule, which is optimal under a single spec-
3i…cation, may turn out to perform quite poorly if that model does not capture properly the
’true’ macroeconomic dynamics. Then, the observation of smooth policy rates can simply
re‡ect the choice of a policy rule that would perform reasonably well over various alternative
policy scenarios.
A general strategy to take model uncertainty into account is to calculate a global optimal
policy as some combination of the policy rules derived separately for each of the relevant
speci…cations (see Stock, 1999). It is worthy to note that the robust rule we are interested in
di¤ers in scope from the one derived with robust control techniques. Indeed, here robustness
has to be understood as a form of hedging against potential misspeci…cations of the macro-
economic dynamics rather than as a way of guarding against worst case scenarios. To this
end, we follow the thick modeling proposed by Granger and Jeon (2001) to pool into a single
policy rule a large number of speci…cations in a given class of nested models. In particular,
we …rst let policy makers implement, at each point in time, some average of the optimal rates
for each of the relevant speci…cations. Then, we identify among a large number of targeting
policies the set of preference parameters that makes such a robust rule matching the data.
Our results shed new lights as well as con…rm conventional wisdoms on the conduct of
US monetary policy in the last decade. First, potential misspeci…cations of the macroeco-
nomic dynamics is an important concern of the Fed such as to explain alone most of the
observed inertial behavior of policy rates. Second, any identi…cation method that did neglect
model uncertainty would deliver a set of policy preferences that cannot be readily interpreted.
Third, the stabilization of output over the cycle has not been a …nal concern of US monetary
authorities whereas the stabilization of in‡ation has been a superior goal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and presents the relative
estimates. Section 3 identi…es the preference parameters for the Greenspan’s tenure and
de…nes the interest rate smoothing puzzle from the comparison between our results and those
obtained in several recent studies. The thick modeling approach to model uncertainty is
introduced in section 4 and then it is used in the following section to re-identify the Fed
policy preferences. The last section concludes while the appendix provides a guideline to
solve numerically the optimal control problem.
42 A small empirical model of the US economy
The central bank faces a dynamic optimal control problem whose solution describes its policy
actions. These are the optimal response of monetary authorities to the evolution of the
economy as captured by the relations among the state variables. We describe such a dynamics
by means of a simple closed economy-two equation framework made up of an aggregate supply
and an aggregate demand, which actually represent the constraints of the policy makers’
optimization problem.
2.1 The structure of the economy
The empirical evidence from VAR studies shows that monetary policy a¤ects the economy at
di¤erent lags (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1998, and Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).
Furthermore, if the central bank faces an intertemporal optimization problem, then forecasting
the behavior of the state variables becomes crucial to set policy rates as the optimal response
to the developments in the economy. It follows that for the purpose of monetary policy
making, which relies on forecasting methods, a backward-looking model may be a suitable
characterization of the macroeconomic dynamics (see Fuhrer, 1997).
Accordingly, we let the structure of the economy evolve as follows:
¼t+1 = ®1¼t +®2¼t¡1 + ®3¼t¡2 + ®4¼t¡3 + ®5yt +"t+1 (1)
yt+1 = ¯1yt + ¯2yt¡1 + ¯3(¹ {t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + ut+1 (2)
where ¼t is the quarterly in‡ation in the GDP chain-weighted price index, pt, calculated at





The quarterly average federal funds rate, it, is expressed in percent per year whereas the four




it¡j; Supply and demand iid shocks
are denoted by "t and ut respectively. All variables are demeaned. All variables but the funds
rate are in logs and rescaled upward on a 100 point basis such that the output gap, say, is
yt = 100 ¤ (log(Qt) ¡ log(Q¤
t)) where Qt and Q¤
t are respectively actual and potential GDP,
both in levels. Therefore, no constants appear in the equations.
On the one hand, the aggregate supply equation in (1), AS henceforth, captures the
in‡ation dynamics by relating in‡ation to its lagged values and to current and lagged output
gaps. On the other hand, the aggregate demand equation in (2), AD henceforth, explicitly
5models the monetary transmission mechanism by relating output gap to its lagged values and
most importantly to past real interest rate (see Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999).
This empirical model of in‡ation and output, although parsimonious, embodies the min-
imal set of variables one may want to include for the analysis of monetary policy (see, for
instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1998), and, as argued in Rudebusch and Svens-
son (1999), it appears to be broadly in line with the view that policy makers hold about
the dynamics of the economy (see the report of the Bank for International Settlements for
11 central bank models, 1995). Moreover, monetary policy a¤ects (through the instrument
it) aggregate demand with one lag and aggregate supply with two lags, in the spirit of the
speci…cations in Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997). Finally, such a dynamics can be interpreted
either as a structural relation or as a reduced-form restricted VAR with impulse responses
that are consistent with those of the FRB-US model.
The AD-AS system is backward-looking and therefore it is subject to the Lucas critique
(1976). It follows that the selection of an inappropriate sample may undermine the stability
of the behavioral parameters of the economy, which is an important condition for drawing
inference. For instance, Muscatelli and Trecroci (2001) show evidence that while the response
of output to interest rate shocks has not signi…cantly changed, the short-run correlation
between output and in‡ation has shifted during the last two decades. To the extent that
this can be ascribed to the productivity growth that has characterized the US economy since
the late 80s, focusing on the sample 1987:3 - 2001:1, which corresponds to the tenure of Alan
Greenspan as Fed chairman, it turns out to be bene…cial to limit parameter variation. Indeed,
one may argue that this period has been marked not only by an increasing macroeconomic
stability and a lower in‡ation but also by the expectations of some form of in‡ation targeting
(see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998), thereby reducing the signi…cance of the Lucas critique.
We estimate individually equations (1) and (2) by OLS. The potential output is obtained
from the Congressional Budget O¢ce whereas all other data are taken from the web-site of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In particular, we collect monthly time-series for the funds
rate, quarterly data for the GDP chain-weighted 1996 commodity price index and quarterly
data for the potential output. All series are seasonally adjusted. We then convert monthly
data in quarterly data by taking end-of-quarter observations. Lastly, we de-mean all variables.
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The system displays a reasonably good empirical …t with an Adjusted R2 equal to 0:58 for
the AS and 0:93 for the AD.1 All estimates have the expected sign but the second lag of
in‡ation in the AS, although it has not explanatory power. Furthermore, the coe¢cient for
the real interest rate is not statistically signi…cant. While undesirable, this result con…rms
the evidence from several studies for the US and the UK over recent samples (see for instance
Muscatelli and Trecroci, 2001, and Neiss and Nelson, 2001). Finally, although these estimates
suggest a minor initial role for monetary policy, the impact of the lagged values of the output
gap in the AD is large implying that the response of aggregate demand to policy rates is much
greater in the long-run.
2.2 The loss function and the optimal monetary policy
We assume that monetary authorities operate according to a targeting rule as de…ned in
Svensson (1999). This corresponds to set the instrument rate so as to bring at each point
in time the target variables in line with the targets by penalizing any future deviation of
the former from the latter. Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), we let the central
bank pursue the stabilization of the four-quarter in‡ation around the in‡ation target, the
stabilization of the output around its potential value and potentially the smoothing of interest
rate. The in‡ation target is assumed to be constant over time and it is normalized to zero
because all variables are demeaned.2 Then, policy rates are set to minimize the following
objective function:
V ar[¹ ¼t] + ¸V ar[yt] + ¹V ar[¢it] (5)
The quarterly average short-term interest rate, it, is regarded as the instrument under policy
makers’ control whereas ¢it stands for its …rst di¤erence. The parameters ¸ and ¹ represent
the central bank’s policy preferences towards output stabilization and interest rate smoothing
1Moreover, the cross-correlation of the errors is 0.137, implying that the parameter estimates are not a¤ected
by the estimation method. Lastly, the Andrews’ test (1993) cannot reject the null of stability for both equations.
2As argued in Dennis (2000), demeaning all variables does not a¤ect the derivation of policy makers’
preferences. Furthermore, our analysis is meant to identify the central bank parameters over the target variables
rather than to estimate the targets per sè. A number of papers cover the issue, including Judd and Rudebusch
(1998), Sack (2000), Favero and Rovelli (2001), and Dennis (2001).
7respectively and unlike in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), who set them exogenously, they
will be determined within the model. The coe¢cient on in‡ation stabilization is normalized to
one such that ¸ and ¹ are expressed in relative terms. Finally, we constrain both parameters
to be non negative meaning that the central bank values both any deviation of output from
its potential and any jump in interest rates as a bad.
On the positive side, the speci…cation in (5) is empirically attractive since, unlike alterna-
tive monetary models as the FRB-US, it is able to predict an interest rate path that exhibits
the kind of inertia observed in the data. On the negative side, the desire for smoothing policy
rates has little theoretical justi…cation beyond the optimal delegation argument according to
which the appointment of a central banker who pursues an alternative objective relative to
the true social one may be welfare improving (see Woodford, 2002, Ch. 7).3 However, it can
be argued that high variability and frequent reversals in interest rate movements may lead to
…nancial instability (see Goodfriend, 1991) as well as they may be interpreted by the private
sector as an admission of earlier policy mistakes (see Lowe and Ellis, 1997), thereby being
undesirable.
The optimal control problem described in (1), (2) and (5) has a convenient state space
representation that is characterized by a quadratic objective and a linear transition law. This
speci…cation leads to the stochastic optimal linear regulator problem according to which the
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In particular, the central bank minimizes the loss (5) subject to the dynamic constraints (1)
and (2). In so doing, it determines an optimal reaction function that can be expressed in the
compact form4:
it = fXt (7)
The coe¢cients in the vector f represent some convolution of the central bank’s preferences,
¸ and ¹, and the behavioral parameters of the economy, ®s and ¯s, such that for any given
distribution of weights in (5) there exists a di¤erent optimal f in (7).
3Alternatively, monetary authority may wish to stabilize the level, rather than the change, of policy rates.
Then, the presence of transaction frictions and/or a zero nominal interest-rate lower bound result in an utility-
based loss function with an interest rate term which enhances social welfare (see Woodford, 2002, Ch. 6)
4The appendix provides a full derivation of the feedback rule that solves the stochastic optimal linear
regulator problem.
8Then, we make the model consistent with our implementation by the timing assumption
that the Fed sets policy rates after the realization of the state variables, which occurs at the
beginning of the period. Hence, we estimate by OLS the stochastic version of the optimal
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with an Adjusted R2 of 0:96.5 The signi…cant parameters show that the monetary authorities
operate in a gradual manner by changing the funds rates in response to both in‡ation and
output gaps. In particular, the …rst lag of the policy rate implies that the Fed tends to
move its instrument in a particular direction over sustained periods, while the second lag
con…rms the potential for few reversals (see Rudebusch, 1995, and Goodhart, 1997). Finally,
the coe¢cients on the interest rate lags sum up to 0:85 consistently with much of the literature
on partial adjustment policy rules. This suggests that the observed policy inertia is greater
than systematic responses to output and in‡ation ‡uctuations would imply.
3 The Fed policy preferences with no model uncertainty
The design of monetary policy depends upon the targeting strategy adopted by the central
bank. This strategy describes a set of policy preferences, which are actually the structural
parameters that characterize the aversion of monetary authorities towards in‡ation, output
and potentially interest rate volatility. Then, a simple way to recover these preferences is
to assume that policy makers are acting optimally and, as a kind of revelation principle, to
extract the relevant information from the observed policy decisions. The control problem
described above shows that the reaction function estimates can be interpreted as convolutions
of the behavioral parameters of the economy and those describing the central bank’s prefer-
ences and therefore they are natural candidates for the purpose at hand.6 Accordingly, given
the point estimates in (3) and (4), we calibrate the preference parameters [¸, ¹] such as to
minimize the distance between the optimal policy and the …tted path of interest rates in (8),
5McCallum and Nelson (1999) argue that in operational policy making the central bank does not observe
(and respond to) the current state of the economy. Using four lags of funds rate, GDP in‡ation and CBO
output gap as instruments does not change signi…cantly neither the point estimates nor the standard errors of
the feedback coe¢cients.
6Moreover, our optimal control problem satis…es the three necessary and su¢cient conditions derived in
Dennis (2000) to identify central bank policy preferences .
9where the distance is measured by the sum of squared deviations over time.7 The optimal
policy describes the path that the funds rates would have followed if the Fed had histori-
cally implemented the optimal rule and therefore, given the actual values of state variables
at the beginning of the sample, it is derived by substituting, period by period, the simulated
dynamics of the X into the reaction function (7). Our identi…cation method applied to the
sample 1987:3 - 2001:1, which corresponds to the Greenspan chairmanship, returns values of
¸ = 1:00 and ¹ = 8:00 for the preferences on output stabilization and interest rate smoothing
respectively. One may be tempted to conclude that while output and in‡ation stabilizations
have received an equal concern, interest rate smoothing has been the major objective of the
Fed. However, we show below that these results can be highly misleading in that they miss
an important feature of actual monetary policy making.
At this point, it is useful to relate our results to several recent studies since there ex-
ists interesting di¤erences and similarities. Favero and Rovelli (2002) identify central bank’s
preferences by estimating via GMM the Euler equations for the solution of alternative speci…-
cations of the optimization problem. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) capture the dynamics of
the economy in a VAR framework and then recover policy makers’ preferences from the esti-
mates of the output-in‡ation variability frontier and those obtained via VAR. Dennis (2001)
and Ozlale (2001) use respectively a full information approach and the Kalman …ltering to
jointly estimate with maximum likelihood the structural model of the economy and the loss
function. These studies but the ones by Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) are built upon a com-
mon empirical model of in‡ation and output, namely the one by Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999), and therefore their …ndings turn out to be directly comparable to ours. Table 1 brings
together our revealed preferences and the estimates from the di¤erent contributions. The
reported values refer to the Greenspan’s tenure, although Favero and Rovelli (2002) do not
distinguish between the Volcker’s and the Greenspan’s chairmanship.8 In particular, Panel A
shows the …rst two moments of the …tted policy rates whereas Panel B displays in columns the
7By de…ning our measure of distance upon …tted rather than actual rates we restrict our attention to the
systematic component of policy rate behaviour, that is, to the component we can explain within an optimal
control framework. Moreover, our results do not change signi…cantly when actual rates enter the calibration
because of the good empirical …t of the feedback estimates.
8Understanding whether the two periods may be described by a single set of policy preferences is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, to the extent that no monetary regime shifts have occured in the post-Volcker
period (see Clarida, Galì and Gertler, 2000), the preference parameters in Favero and Rovelli (2002) can be
taken as a rough approximation of those in the restricted sample for Alan Greenspan only. As we are interested
only in a qualitative comparison between our optimal policy rule and those from other studies, we consider
such an approximation only as a minor in the interpretation of the results.
10Fed policy preferences, the …rst two moments of the optimal paths and the average distance
between optimal and …tted rates. Figure 1 plots the optimal and the …tted path of policy
rates for the four studies.
The …rst two lines of Panel B in Table 1 refer to the present work and the one by Dennis
(2001).9 On the one hand, these sets of policy preferences predict a path for policy rates
capable to replicate the kind of smoothness observed in the data (see the top panels of Figure
1). Indeed, the …rst two moments are broadly consistent in both cases with those of the …tted
path in Panel A and the average distance, which is computed on squared values, is fairly low.
On the other hand, they rely upon extremely large parameters for interest rate smoothing
which cannot be easily motivated within the optimal monetary policy literature.10
By contrast, the last two lines of Table 1, which refer to the works by Favero and Rovelli
(2002) and Ozlale (2001), return more plausible weights for the inertial coe¢cient in the loss
function. However, the bottom panels of Figure 1 show that this can be done only at the cost
of an optimal policy rule that is so volatile as to contradict the evidence on the funds rates.
The results at this stage seem to call for a sort of interest rate-smoothing puzzle. A trade-
o¤ between an inertial behavior of policy rates and a plausible value for the relative preference
parameter seems to emerge, thereby suggesting that the source of interest rate smoothing has
to be found elsewhere.
The structure of the economy proposed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), while empiri-
cally attractive, is indeed very simple and the omission of any relevant variable may turn out
to be an issue for the results obtained so far. Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, the
lack of knowledge about the ’true’ model of the economy may lead policy makers to consider
various alternative policy scenarios, each one corresponding to a di¤erent speci…cation of the
underlying macroeconomic dynamics. We explore such an alternative in the next section to
assess the potential of model uncertainty to account for the observed interest rate smoothing.
4 Model uncertainty
A common observation across central banks is that interest rates are moved in a more mod-
erate fashion than certain equivalent optimal monetary policies predict. The di¢culty of
9We thank Richard Dennis for having kindly o¤ered the FIML estimates for the Greenspan’s period.
10For instance, the utility based loss function in Woodford (2002, Ch. 6 and 7), albeit derived in a di¤erent
class of models, implies a theoretical value of ¹ no greater than 0:28, which is based on stuctural estimates for
the US economy.
11standard models to rationalize policy inertia has led to incorporate various forms of model
uncertainty into the policy makers’ optimization problem. In practice, monetary authorities
know far less about the dynamics of the economy than simple policy experiments presume
and model parameters are likely to be better viewed as random. In particular, suppose that
monetary authorities know the distribution of parameters but not the realization; then, un-
certainty can be introduced at di¤erent levels. A Brainard-style multiplicative uncertainty
(1967) considers parameter distributions that are centered around the estimates of a speci…c
model. This means that policy makers know the parameter …rst moments on an ex ante
basis, although they do not know the values that realize in any given quarter. Rudebusch
(2001), Estrella and Mishkin (1999), and Peersman and Smets (1999) …nd that parsimonious
structural models and simple policy rules predict only negligible attenuations of policy action
in the context of such an uncertainty. By contrast, Sack (2000), Salmon and Martin (1999)
and Söderström (1999) show using unrestricted VARs and unrestricted policy rules that the
response of monetary authorities may result quantitatively more moderate, although they
conclude that multiplicative parameter uncertainty alone is not enough to replicate the kind
of smoothness observed in the data.
Another way to think of model uncertainty is to regard also the parameter mean as
unknown. In fact, if policy makers fear that a small structural model is misspeci…ed, they
would have no reason to believe that the ’true’ parameters coincide, even on average, with
the least square estimates. A valuable robustness check is then to vary the values of some key
model parameter to understand whether this is the relevant form of uncertainty that central
banks face. Rudebusch (2001) shows that the slope coe¢cients on in‡ation and output gap are
indeed crucial as the perturbation of each of them, everything equals, results in a signi…cant,
but not exhaustive, attenuation of the policy stance.
These results altogether are very promising in that they point towards model uncertainty,
in a broad sense, as the relevant source of the observed policy gradualism. Moreover, they
suggest that the policy preference reported above may be ’misleading’ as no identi…cation
method takes such an uncertainty into account and only the point estimates of the model
parameters enter the analyses. By contrast, this section incorporates model speci…cation
uncertainty into the calibration of the Fed policy preferences. In so doing, we attempt to
solve for the interest rate smoothing puzzle by assessing the potential of a broad type of
uncertainty for explaining the inertial behavior of policy rates.
12Our approach departures from previous studies along three lines. First, we regard the
point estimates of our benchmark model only as one set of possible realizations. In other
words, we allow the average value of the distributions to be di¤erent from the estimated
parameters. Moreover, rather than assuming that these distributions are known ex-ante, we
let them be shaped ex-post by the point estimates obtained for each of the possible models.
Lastly, in addition to the kind of slope coe¢cient uncertainty in Rudebusch (2001), we also
allow for simultaneous perturbations of all parameters as potentially omitted variables are
likely to a¤ect each of the point estimates in the model.
In practise, we follow Granger and Jeon (2001) and we label this approach to model
uncertainty thick modeling. We keep all close speci…cations according to some statistical
criterion, …nd their outputs that relate to the design of optimal monetary policy and pool
these values. The label ’thick’, as opposed to ’thin’, re‡ects the fact that if one estimates and
plots each model-speci…cation she will get a ’thick’ representation of the optimal monetary
policy, that is, a curve whose width is made up of as many ’thin’ curves as the number of
speci…cations that survive the trimming of the outliers.
Before discussing our ’thick’ strategy, we consider worthwhile to describe how model un-
certainty has been traditionally approached.
4.1 Traditional approaches
The robustness of monetary policy to model uncertainty has been the focus of a number of
recent empirical studies. The goal has been to assess the performance of optimal rules moving
from the model in which they are derived to a set of alternative speci…cations as well as to
establish the e¢ciency of simple policy rules (see Taylor, 1999). For example, McCallum
(1998) shows that monetary-based instrument rules overperform optimal ones over a range of
possible macroeconomic dynamics. Moreover, simple partial adjustment policy mechanisms
and simple forecast-based instrument rules responding to an in‡ation horizon no longer than
one year are found to e¢ciently stabilize in‡ation and output in a variety of forward-looking
models (see Levine, Wieland and Williams,1999 and 2001). Essentially, these rules set the
change in the funds rate rather than the level as the optimal value of the lagged policy rate
coe¢cient is close to one. The intuition is that the central bank, which has established a
reputation of conducting monetary policy in a gradual manner, can achieve its goals while
maintaining a low level of interest rate volatility through the expectations of policy inertia
13(see also Goodfriend, 1991 and Woodford, 2002, Ch. 7).
An alternative approach to solve for model uncertainty is provided by the techniques of
robust control (see Hansen and Sargent, 2001, chapters 6 and 8). This method speci…es a risk
function and a minimax criterion that serve to form a non-parametric set of perturbations
around the policy makers’ model. The latter is assumed to be an approximation that belongs
to a potentially time varying and state dependent bounded neighborhood of the ’true’ model of
the economy. Then, given the least favorable scenario, that is roughly speaking the maximum
value that the loss function can take in that neighborhood, the robust optimal rule is chosen
so as to minimize the maximum value function. Interestingly, Stock (1999), Onatski and
Stock (2002), and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) show that model uncertainty may
call for a more activist policy stance, although the worst possible models for the kind of
historical Fed policy rule may not describe plausible structures of the economy (see Onatski,
2000). The intuition for this result comes from the fact that the central bank plays a game
against a malevolent nature in which only worst case scenarios matter for policy making. This
implies that an aggressive rule may be the optimal response of monetary authorities to large
departures of in‡ation and output from the target values.
4.2 A novel approach: ’thick modeling’
The standard practice of econometric modelling is to choose among a set of relevant spec-
i…cations the best according to some model selection criterion like adjusted R2, Akaike or
Schwarz, discarding any information in the alternative speci…cations. In practical policy
making, however, it is not clear that this may be a good strategy and policy makers, who are
uncertain about the future state of the economy, may …nd retaining and combining all infor-
mation in a number of close speci…cations a superior strategy. The reason for that mirrors
the results in the literature of optimal forecasting (and portfolio allocation) which demon-
strate that the combination of forecasts (assets) is often a better procedure than using the
best single forecast (asset). Then, mutatis mutandis, the monetary authority may prefer to
consider the range of a wide number of optimal monetary policies, each one corresponding to
the solution of the control problem associated to a di¤erent structure of the economy, rather
than to come up with a single policy rule which is optimal only within the model speci…cation
in which it has been derived. In so doing, they may end up with as many policy prescritions
as the number of relevant macroeconomic scenarios. To the extent that the latter di¤er in
14the lag speci…cation of the monetary transmission mechanism and that policy makers have
no strong a priori on the future state of the economy, the thick modelling of combining those
prescriptions comes as a simple strategy for the design of a global optimal policy without
requiring any restrictive decision about what model will provide the best description of the
economy.
In practice, we specify a class of nested models for the structure of the economy and
propose some a priori criterion to pool into a single robust thick policy rule the information
that relate to the design of monetary policy. To this end, we estimate by OLS the dynamics
generated by the relevant combinations of a base set of eight regressors for the AS and nine
for the AD whose richest speci…cation takes the following form:
¼t+1 = ®1¼t + ®2¼t¡1 + ®3¼t¡2 + ®4¼t¡3+
®5yt + ®6yt¡1 + ®7yt¡2 + ®8yt¡3 + »t+1 (9)
yt+1 = ¯1yt + ¯2yt¡1 + ¯3yt¡2 +¯4yt¡3 + ¯5¼t+
¯6¼t¡1 + ¯7¼t¡2 + ¯8¼t¡3 + ¯9 (¹ {t ¡ ¹ ¼t) +´t+1 (10)
The selection of the relevant models is based on both empirical and theoretical arguments.
First, we keep …xed across speci…cations the …rst lag of in‡ation and output gap in the AS and
AD respectively. In so doing, we end up with those models displaying a fairly good empirical
…t. Moreover, we discard the speci…cations that do not allow monetary policy to have a direct
impact on the economy through both equations. In particular, we take the real interest rate,
¹ {t ¡ ¹ ¼t, as a further …xed regressor and we constraint the AS to be dependent from, at least,
one of the lagged values of the output gap. The latter amounts to cut o¤ approximately the
…ve percent of the 27x27 models speci…ed in this class. Finally, we derive the optimal policy
rules for each of the retained AD-AS speci…cations and we let policy makers implement, at
each point in time, the average of the optimal rates associated to those speci…cations.
A number of alternative weighting schemes may be appropriated for computing the av-
erage optimal policy. Instead of using a simple statistical pooling, Granger and Jeon (2001)
argues that a simple averaging may serve for the purpose at hand, corresponding to what in
the literature is usually refered to as a non-informative prior with equal weights given to dif-
ferent monetary policies. An alternative somewhat in the spirit of Bayesian econometrics is to
weight the OLS estimates across models by some statistical criterion corrected for the degrees
15of freedom. Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2000) propose a weighting criterion anal-
ogous to the Schwarz in the context of the so-called Bayesian averaging of classical estimates
(BACE), which has the advantage over the Bayesian model averaging of not requiring any
speci…cation of prior distributions for the model parameters.
These alternative weighting schemes describe the robust policy rules that we use in the
next section to evaluate the ability of model uncertainty to account for the observed interest
rate smoothing. Our thick strategy is in the spirit of Favero and Milani (2001), although
we take three important departures. First, we analyze a di¤erent sample according to the
reasoning that policy preferences are Chairman-speci…c. Second, we endogenously determine
these preferences rather than simply imposing them. Lastly, we evaluate the robustness of
our results to di¤erent weighting schemes for averaging the optimal policies obtained under
the alternative policy scenarios.
5 The Fed policy preferences under model uncertainty
In this section, we use our identi…cation method to recover the preference parameters for the
Greenspan’s tenure in the presence of model uncertainty. In order to gauge the merits of the
robust thick policy rule we compare our results with those obtained under a multiplicative
parameter uncertainty which a number of researchers have advocated as an important, al-
though not exhaustive, source of policy attenuation (see Sack, 2000, Sack and Wieland, 2000,
and Rudebusch, 2001 among others).
It is worthy to note that in contrast to the analysis in section 3, which considers a single
speci…cation of the economy and thus a single optimal rule, the calibration is based here on
the distance between …tted and thick policy rates, where the latter are computed as some
average of the optimal rules for each of the relevant models. In so doing, we incorporate
model uncertainty into the identi…cation of policy preferences. In other words, we investigate
whether the Fed cares about model misspeci…cation by assessing the ability of a robust rule to
match the data without resorting to implausibly high values for the interest rate smoothing
parameter.
5.1 The robust thick policy rule
The third row of table 2 reports some descriptive statistics of the optimal rule under model
uncertainty as well as the corresponding calibrated policy parameters. The revealed prefer-
16ences for the Greenspan’s chairmanship write now ¸ = 0:00 and ¹ = 0:11 while the …rst two
moments of the associated optimal path are consistent with the historical policy (…rst row).
Moreover, the average distance is still fairly low and the standard deviation of the interest
rate changes, which actually de…nes interest rate smoothing, remains virtually identical mov-
ing from the historical rule to the robust thick rule. While the statistics and the following
…gures on model uncertainty refer to the simple average case, the picture does not change,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, weighting each optimal policy with the relative adjusted
R2, Akaike and Schwarz criterion respectively. In the light of our trimming strategy, this
result does not come as a surprise since the closer are the retained speci…cations the more the
weighted average tends to the simple average, that is the grater is the likelihood that similar
weights are attached to each speci…cation.
Figure 2 compares the two optimal paths associated to the preferences ¸ = 0:00 and
¹ = 0:11 in the absence and under model uncertainty respectively. The robust thick policy
rule e¤ectively describes the main features of funds rate movements throughout the sample,
although there are some di¤erences in magnitude. While this suggests that other source of
uncertainty such as measurement errors for in‡ation and output gap may also be relevant,
we …nd that by considering model misspeci…cations most of the interest rate smoothing puzzle
seems to vanish, as the relative preference parameter take now only a modest value. Model
uncertainty is eventually crucial because whenever neglected the optimal policy rule looses its
ability to match the data. Hence, any identi…cation method that did not take this form of
uncertainty into account would miss an important part of the story, thereby delivering a set
of policy preferences that cannot be sensibly interpreted.
The revealed policy preferences computed under model uncertainty show that the conduct
of monetary policy in the US is successfully described by a strict in‡ation targeting as de…ned
by Svensson (1999), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). According to it, the stabilization
of output around potential has not been a …nal concern of the Federal Reserve (i.e. ¸ = 0:00).
However, we do not mean that the output gap has been unimportant in policy actions. Indeed,
as argued by Favero and Rovelli (2002) and Dennis (2001), it may well be that the output gap
has been regarded as a leading indicator for future in‡ation rather than as a goal variable per
sè (i.e. as an argument in the reaction function rather than in the loss). An alternative, in
the spirit of the evidence in Smets (1999), Estrella and Mishkin (1999), and Wieland (1998)
on output gap uncertainty, is that monetary authorities have placed less weight on the most
17poorly measured target, or yet, that the marked productivity growth of the 90s has drastically
reduced any concern towards output stabilization.
5.2 Model uncertainty vs. parameter uncertainty
The result that uncertainty makes smoother an otherwise volatile path of policy rates does
not come as new in the literature and a number of empirical studies have recently shown that
multiplicative parameter uncertainty limits the responsiveness of the interest rate (see Sack,
2000 and the references therein). A relevant question at this point is the extent to which
parameter uncertainty would be capable alone to replicate the observed path or rather there
exists room for other forms of uncertainty. To this end, we bring together in the last two rows
of table 2 some descriptive statistics for the robust policy rules obtained under model and
parameter uncertainty respectively. We take as given the revealed policy preferences ¸ = 0:00
and ¹ = 0:11, which assigns a very limited role to an interest rate smoothing goal, so that
the performance of the robust rules can be readily compared. The computational di¤erence
between the two robust rules stems from the distribution of the AS-AD coe¢cients which
only under parameter uncertainty are centered around our estimates of the Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) model and shaped by the relative estimated standard errors. By contrast,
the robust thick approach does not impose any mean value to the parameter distributions
whose support re‡ects a model speci…cation uncertainty rather than the classical estimation
uncertainty due to sampling.
The last row of table 2 shows that multiplicative parameter uncertainty attenuates the
policy response of monetary authorities such that the relative robust descriptive statistics
come closer to the data than the single speci…cation counterparts. Nevertheless, the robust
optimal policy seems to reduce but not to close the gap with the observed monetary policy
con…rming the conclusions in Sack (2000) and Rudebusch (2001). In addition, taking model
uncertainty into account makes the robust thick policy rule more successful at describing
the policy rate dynamics than the parameter uncertainty robust rule. This can be seen not
only from the …rst two moments and the average distances but also, more importantly, from
the standard deviations of the interest rate changes. Consistent with these …ndings, Figure 3
shows that the behavior of policy rates is considerably smoother under model uncertainty than
under parameter uncertainty as the robust thick policy rule shows more limited deviations
from the historical rule.
18We interpret these results as the evidence that model misspeci…cation has been an impor-
tant concern of the Fed such that its ability to limit the responsiveness of the fed funds rate
goes beyond the ability of a multiplicative parameter uncertainty.11
6 Conclusions
Actual policy rates appear to be smoother than optimal monetary policies predict. An obvious
way to reconcile the historical evidence with an optimizing central bank behavior is to model
the aversion to interest rate ‡uctuations as an independent argument in the central bank’s
loss function. However, the relative parameter should be imposed at values so high as they
cannot be easily motivated by the theory, thereby making this choice alone unsatisfactory.
This paper contributes to the literature of optimal monetary policy by presenting a novel
method to solve for a relevant form of uncertainty in practical policy making, namely un-
certainty about the structure of the economy. While there may well be also other rationales
such as data uncertainty or a minor goal to avoid interest rate variability, it is shown that
the concern for potential misspeci…cations of the macroeconomic dynamics creates incentives
for monetary authorities to move policy rates in a gradual manner. Indeed, a thich approach
to model uncertainty appears to solve most of the observed interest rate smoothing puzzle as
the preference calibration based on a robust policy rule returns values which are more readily
interpretable. Moreover, the preference parameters show that the Greenspan’s tenure as Fed
chairman is e¤ectively described by a strict in‡ation targeting policy according to which the
stabilization of in‡ation around its target has been the only concern of monetary authorities.
We take these results as a promising deal for future research and the calibration exercise
we propose proves these potentialities. Intriguing identi…cation strategies for the preference
parameters have returned unattractive results in that they display either implausible values
for the inertial coe¢cient or extremely volatile paths for the policy rates whenever model
uncertainty is neglected. By contrast, our revealed preferences move to sensible values when
the calibration incorporates a wide number of possible speci…cations. This seems to suggest
that most of the observed policy inertia can be better interpreted as a consequence of mone-
11It should be noticed that we have modelled parameter uncertainty as the perturbation of the slope coe¢cient
of in‡ation and the interest rate sensitivity on output only. While varying all parameters produces only
limited changes, an alternative would be to consider a richer macroeconomics dynamics as the one in a VAR
speci…cation of the economy. However, Sack (2000) shows that even involving very persistent interest rate
movements, the optimal policy derived within a VAR dynamics is still more aggressive than the observed
policy.
19tary policy making under uncertainty rather than as an objective in itself and that omitted
model uncertainty may lead to the spurious …nding of an independent goal for interest rate
smoothing.
Furthermore, our robust thick modeling can be extended to alternative formulations of the
in‡ation dynamics and the output gap dynamics in order to evaluate the empirical relevance
of model uncertainty within a class of non-nested speci…cations. Lansing and Trehan (2001),
for instance, show that by introducing some degree of forward-looking behavior in output,
the responses to in‡ation and output gap recommended by an optimizing Taylor rule are less
pronounced. In particular, they show that private sector expectations may be an important
channel through which monetary policy can be e¤ectively conducted by means of small interest
rate changes (see also Levin, Wieland and Williams, 1999, Sack and Wieland, 2000, and
Castelnuovo, 2003). However, Söderlind, Söderström and Vredin (2002), who calibrate the
preferences of the Fed within a New-Keynesian model of output and in‡ation, still …nd a
large value for the policy parameter on interest rate smoothing. This suggests that model
uncertainty about the relevant macroeconomic dynamics may turn out to be an issue also in
such a framework and therefore further work can be usefully done along these lines.
20Appendix: the optimal control problem
For a discount factor ±, 0 < ± < 1, the central bank faces an intertemporal optimization





according to which it minimizes the expected discounted sum of future loss values. In partic-
ular, the objective function reads in each period:
LOSSt = ¹ ¼2
t + ¸y2
t + ¹(it ¡ it¡1)
2 (12)
The loss function is quadratic in the deviations of output and in‡ation from their target values
and embodies an additional term that is meant to penalize for an excessive volatility of the
policy instrument, it. The parameters ¸ and ¹ represent the relative policy preferences of
the central bank towards output stabilization and interest rate smoothing respectively. The
in‡ation stabilization weight in the objective function is normalized to one.
When the discount factor, ±, approaches unity, the intertemporal loss function in (11)
approaches the unconditional mean of the period loss function:
E [LOSSt] = V ar[¹ ¼t] + ¸V ar[yt] + ¹V ar[¢it] (13)
The constraints of the optimization problem describe the structure of the economy, and
they are speci…ed by the AD-AS system in (1) and (2). This has a convenient state-space
representation of the form:
Xt+1 = AXt + Bit + ´t+1 (14)
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21Xt+1 is the 9x1 vector of state variables, it is the policy control (i.e. the federal funds rate)
and ´t+1 is a 9x1 vector of supply and demand iid normally distributed shocks with mean
vector zero and covariance matrix E´t´0
t = -. Lastly, A and B are the matrices of behavioral
parameters.
The loss function in (12) can be represented in a more compact form by de…ning the 3x1
vector Yt of goal variables. This vector reads:
Yt = CXt + Dit (18)
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Accordingly, the loss function can be rewritten as:
LOSSt = Y 0
tRYt (20)
where R is a negative semide…nite symmetric 3x3 matrix characterized by the weight 1, ¸ and
¹ on the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Then, the central bank optimal control problem










subject to the dynamic evolution of the economy described in (14) and given the current state
of the economy Xt.





0 are convenient forms for the stochastic optimal linear regulator problem (see Ljungqvist and
Sargent, Ch. 4, 2000). It follows that the feedback rule that solves the optimization is linear
and independent from the problem’s noise statistics, -, as the certainty equivalence holds.




i = ¡(V 0 + ±B0PA)X (22)
This implies the following feedback rule for the policy instrument
i = fX (23)




¢¡1 (V 0 + ±B0PA)
The 9x9 matrix P is the solution of the algebraic Riccati equation:
P = Q + ±(A + Bf)
0 P (A + Bf) + f0Sf +V f + f0V 0 (24)
where Q, V and S are de…ned as C0RC, C0RD and D0RD respectively.
The reaction function (23) resembles an augmented Taylor’s rule according to which mone-
tary authorities set the federal funds rate in every period as the optimal response to movements
in the current and lagged values of the state variables as well as lagged values of the fed funds
rate itself.
Given this optimal feedback rule, the transition law of the economy can be rewritten as
Xt+1 = MXt + ´t+1 where the 9x9 matrix M is equal to A + Bf.
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Table 1 - Historical policy rule vs. optimal policy rules:
a quantitative comparison of empirical evidence
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the fitted policy rule, 1987:3 – 2001:1
Mean Standard deviation
0.000 1.7307
Panel B: Descriptive statistics, policy preferences and average distance of the optimal rules


















Ozlale (2001) l = 0.525
m = 0.975
0.5563 2.4752 2.8621
* The estimates in Favero and Rovelli are based on the Volcker-Greenspan period, 1980:3 1998:3, rather than on the Greenspan
tenure only, from the 1987:3 onwards. As discussed in the main text, this does not affect our conclusions.
Note: the preference parameter on inflation stabilization is normalized to one. The parameter on output stabilization is denoted by l
while the one on interest rate smoothing is m. The average distance is measured as the mean of the sum of the squared deviations
between optimal and fitted policy rates at each point in time.
Table 2 – Optimal monetary policy rules and uncertainty: descriptive statistics
Optimal Rules Estimates Mean Standard deviation





Fitted policy rule -
- 0.000 1.7307 0.5207 -
Thin policy rule l = 0.000
m = 0.111












0.3051 2.9353 0.8439 3.5341
Note: the preference parameter on inflation stabilization is normalized to one. The parameter on output stabilization is denoted by l
while the one on interest rate smoothing is m. The average distance is measured as the mean of sum of the squared deviations between
optimal and fitted policy rates at each point in time. The thick robust policy rule is computed as the simple average at each point in time
of the optimal rates for each of the possible specifications. The parameter uncertainty robust policy rule is computed as multiplicative
uncertainty on the key coefficients a5 (slope of the Phillips curve, equation (1) in the main text) and b3 (semi-elasticity of the output-gap
with respect to the real interest rate, equation (2) in the main text). The uncertainty is determined upon the Variance-Covariance matrix
of the OLS estimators.28
Figure 1 - Historical policy rule vs. optimal policy rules:
a graphical comparison of empirical evidence
Note: the preference parameter on inflation stabilization is normalized to one. The parameter on output
stabilization is denoted by l while the one on interest rate smoothing is m. Each optimal path shows the
values that the funds rate would have taken if the Fed had historically implemented that optimal policy
rule. Demeaned values of the federal funds rate are on the vertical axis.29
Figure 2 - Thick robust policy rule vs. thin policy rule
Note: The preference parameter on inflation stabilization is normalized to one. The parameter on
output stabilization is denoted by l while the one on interest rate smoothing is m. The optimal
paths show the values that the funds rate would have taken if the Fed had historically
implemented the optimal policy rule. The thick robust policy rule is computed as the simple











































Figure 3 - Model vs. parameter uncertainty
Note: The preference parameter on inflation stabilization is normalized to one. The parameter on output stabilization is denoted by
l while the one on interest rate smoothing is m. The optimal paths show the values that the funds rate would have taken if the Fed
had historically implemented the optimal policy rule. The thick model uncertainty robust policy rule is computed as the simple
average at each point in time of the optimal federal funds rates for each of the possible specifications. The parameter uncertainty
robust policy rule is computed as multiplicative uncertainty on the key coefficients a5 (slope of the Phillips curve, equation (1) in
the main text) and b3 (semi-elasticity of the output-gap with respect to the real interest rate, equation (2) in the main text). The
uncertainty is determined upon the Variance-Covariance matrix of the OLS estimators.